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Pirmin Stekeler. Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes: Ein dialogischer Kommentar. Volume 1:
Gewißheit und Vernunft. Volume 2: Geist und Religion. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2014. Vol.
1: Pp. 1253. Cloth, €68.00. Vol. 2: Pp. 1088. Cloth, €48.00.
The author is past vice president of both the international Hegel Society and the German
Ludwig Wittgenstein society and has previously published books on logic, analytic
philosophy, and Hegel (under the full name Stekeler-Weithofer). He describes himself as
interested in the “reconstruction of the relationship between traditional philosophy (Plato,
Kant, Hegel) and the formal-analytic movement (Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine),”
and this new work is fully representative of this interest. Explicitly eschewing any interest in
“archival” history of philosophy, Stekeler offers a “rational reconstruction” of what he takes
to be the argument of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. He does so by means of a “dialogical
commentary” on what he describes as, next to Kant’s ﬁrst Critique, “methodologically
considered, the most important philosophical work of the last 300 years” (1:24).
The declared aim of Stekeler’s “commentary” is simply “to make Hegel’s book readable
(or more readable)” (1:23) and to do so by offering a new overall interpretation of the
same. Whereas Hegel remains (allegedly) “banned” from the undergraduate and graduate
curriculum of American colleges and universities (1:25), Stekeler proposes to remedy this
situation by bringing him into a productive dialogue with the “formal-analytic” tradition.
Stekeler, however, is more interested in articulating a speciﬁc set of issues and defending
a speciﬁc conception of what philosophy is or should be. He ﬁnds this program obscurely
present in Hegel, but declares that he is less concerned with demonstrating that this actually
is Hegel’s position than with developing the position itself. Thus he maintains correctly
that his “commentary” should be comprehensible on its own, entirely apart from anything
that Hegel actually wrote (1:22–23).
Stekeler’s dialogical commentary on the Phenomenology possesses one enormous
advantage over all others, however, in that it is not ﬁlled with paraphrases and direct
quotation from Hegel’s text because it includes the entire text of Hegel’s work. Each volume
begins with a lengthy and often dense introduction, in which the author indicates his
approach to the text and develops in broad stokes his innovative interpretation of it. These
introductions are followed by commentary in which a paragraph from Hegel is followed by
at least one and usually many more paragraphs by Stekeler. One wishes this very effective
format were adopted more widely. The commentary itself, though sometimes unavoidably
repetitive, is insightful, imaginative, and philosophically sophisticated.
The philosopher who emerges from Stekeler’s reading is neither a dogmatic materialist
nor an advocate of “scientism”; nor is he a supernaturalist or “metaphysician” of any stripe,
and speciﬁcally not an exponent of the “metaphysics of spirit.” Nor is he a crypto-theologian
whose “absolute” is just another name for God, nor a conservative apologist for the Prussian
state, nor a proto-totalitarian advocate of the subordination of the individual to the state or
to “world history.” Indeed, he does not have a “system” at all, nor assert any philosophical
“theses” (1:17). Instead, he is “the philosopher of the personal subject and of freedom and
the logician of subjectivity and hence of modernity” (1:13).
According to Stekeler’s anti-metaphysical reading, Geist is a term for what is “generically
human,” a transcendental “we” comparable to Rousseau’s volunté générale, and absolute spirit
is identical to the community of rational beings, often interpreted here as a community of
language users. Geist is “the recognized communal [gemeinsame] system of those forms of
praxis and those institutions which ﬁrst make possible cooperative acting and communicative
speech and thereby also make possible individual acting and thinking” (2:115).
“All transsubjective normativity is founded in co-operative role-structure of communal
action and life” (2:21), and it is only by actively participating in this “universal form of
praxis” that one becomes a personal subject through shared cultural traditions. Moreover,
spirit is actual only in the concrete form of the individual person who has been cultivated
by communal norms. “Hegel’s Phenomenology is thus an analysis of the generic forms of
cooperation, which essentially co-determine all normative correctness whether of truth or of
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moral goodness, and are, precisely for this reason, primarily constitutive of the inner form of
the spirituality of the human being as a personal subjectivity or as a person conscious of his
subjectivity” (1:41). We normally recognize the role of these communal forms only implicitly
by permitting them to determine our inferences and our actions; it is only in philosophy
that this becomes explicit, and “spirit” is no longer misunderstood as a transcendent God.
The celebrated Weltgeist is simply another name for its only appropriate institution: spirit
as a whole in the form of Wissenschaft or “science” (2:1010)—“though hardly any readers
have recognized this” (2:14). “Absolute knowing” coincides with philosophizing, which,
properly understood, consists purely in the logical analysis of the structure and forms of
Geist itself (2:987). Hegel also calls this “speculative knowing,” which simply means metalevel logical reﬂection upon all forms of spirit, but speciﬁcally upon Wissen itself (1:44).
In the end, however, absolute knowing is not limited to philosophy, but includes all forms
of Wissenschaft, a communally undertaken enterprise through which we develop and gain
collective control over our normal forms of inference and expectations, and thereby over
our collective actions (2:986).
Hegel’s vaunted “concept” or Begriff designates the entire network of meanings and
material inferences that are implicitly presupposed in our everyday practices of speaking,
knowing, and doing. This system accompanies every intuition and orients and guides all
our practices, theoretical and practical, by providing us with “norms” for evaluating them
(2:1003). Accordingly, Hegel’s Phenomenology is really concerned with “typical assertions, i.e.,
with the manners of appearance of the spiritual: in reason, in understanding, and, above all,
in consciousness” (1:28). The aim of the Phenomenology is to let these same forms “show
themselves.” Hegel does this by beginning with various aporia, which are then resolved
dialectically via arguments that make explicit (für uns) certain implicit (an sich) norms of
correct knowing and acting, which thereby display their own inadequacies.
Such a method unequivocally rejects all claims to immediacy and all foundationalist
conceptions of philosophical argumentation. All our reﬂections begin with speciﬁc
problems, and thus with implicit assumptions, and the goal of philosophy is simply to bring
these to light and to examine them, with the hope of improving our “inferential practices.”
Hence, “phenomenology, in Hegel’s sense, is the continuation of transcendental philosophy
as a critique of meaning,” which reveals that there is simply no immediate access either to
the world or to ourselves (2:18).
By pursuing this phenomenological method, which Stekeler frequently describes as the
dialectical analysis of meaning (die Methode sinnanalytischer Dialektik), the philosopher not
only succeeds in making explicit certain contradictions or tensions implicit in our ordinary
forms of inference and linguistic practices, but makes us explicitly aware for the ﬁrst time
of these forms themselves, thus making possible further progress toward making explicit
additional forms. But he is always aware that “one cannot make everything explicit,” since
“correct understanding is always practical,” which is to say, always has an implicit dimension
(1:35).
This is clearly no “introduction” to Hegel’s text nor “guide” for the perplexed.
Indeed, readers without prior acquaintance with the Phenomenology are likely to become
discouraged by Stekeler’s commentary. It is a sophisticated and original interpretation of
the Phenomenology, which explicitly challenges, while largely ignoring, virtually all previous
readings. It presupposes close familiarity with the canonical texts and problems of analytic
philosophy and, speciﬁcally, with the kind of inferentialist semantics developed by Robert
Brandom under the inﬂuence of Wilfred Sellers. For this reason, it is likely to be ignored
or rejected out of hand by more traditionally oriented scholars. This would be regrettable,
however, since one can only welcome efforts such as this to demonstrate the contemporary
relevance of Hegel’s philosophy by recasting it in a more contemporary idiom and showing
its relevance to current philosophical debates.
It remains an open question whether the views developed so rigorously and ingeniously
by Stekeler actually resemble Hegel’s own views and are consistent with what we actually
know about his project and his intentions. Stekeler professes to have little interest in
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such questions, so anyone who does will have to turn to more “archival” and “contextual”
scholarship.
Daniel Breazeale
University of Kentucky

Sandra Lapointe and Clinton Tolley, editors. New Anti-Kant. History of Analytic Philosophy,
7. Hampshire-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. xii + 295. Cloth, $95.00.
New Anti-Kant is the title of the book. New? Yes, it was a new Anti-Kant when it was ﬁrst
published in 1850. Another Anti-Kant, this one by Benedikt Stattler, had appeared in 1788—
the year in which František Příhonský, the author of New Anti-Kant, was born. Příhonský is
well-known as the editor of Bernard Bolzano’s brilliant posthumous booklet Paradoxien des
Unendlichen, which appeared in 1851 and was quoted with great respect by a number of
eminent mathematicians, Richard Dedekind, Georg Cantor, and Bertrand Russell among
them. Only a few copies of Příhonský’s Anti-Kant survived. It took more than 150 years for a
new German edition of the book to be published in 2003 (in Beiträge zur Bolzano-Forschung,
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag). Lapointe, who had already edited a French translation
of the book in 2006, now provides, together with Tolley, a careful English edition.
As the subtitle of the book tells us, it is an “Examination of the Critique of Pure Reason
according to the Concepts Laid Down in Bolzano’s Theory of Science.” The potential scholarly
interest for such a book is all the greater because the attention paid to Bolzano’s philosophy
has grown tremendously over the course of the last few decades. For Bolzano was an
important part of the process that led to the publication of New Anti-Kant. Not only did
Příhonský write the book as the result of Bolzano’s encouragement, under his supervision,
but considerable parts of the book were adopted verbatim from Bolzano’s Theory of Science
and from his correspondence with Franz Exner.
For Bolzano, Kant’s doctrines had always been somewhat like a philosophical anvil.
Bolzano’s critical discussions of Kant’s philosophy permeate Bolzano’s two main works,
the Theory of Science and the Textbook of the Science of Religion, providing their subject matter
with a number of comments and notes scattered about his works. To gather these views in
a systematic way was to be the task ascribed to his friend and pupil, Příhonský.
In the main text of the book, the “Treatise,” Příhonský goes, step by step, through the
Critique of Pure Reason. He always presents, ﬁrst, Kant’s relevant doctrines, either in Kant’s
own words or in a short summary. He then proceeds to assess it critically, mostly using
Bolzano’s concepts and citing his doctrines. Příhonský restricts himself for the most part to
Kant’s doctrines as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, the only exception being Kant’s
views on ethics (187–206) in which case his Critique of Practical Reason and his Grounding for
the Metaphysics of Morals are also taken into account.
Lapointe and Tolley have done a splendid editorial job. The main challenge for
the editors resided in the fact that Příhonský’s New Anti-Kant deals with two divergent
philosophical systems that are presented in two divergent philosophical languages. The
difﬁculties associated with providing appropriate translations of Kant’s works are notorious,
but in this case the translation of Kant’s German had in addition to be matched with
Bolzano’s German. And even Bolzano’s relatively plain German offered several different
terminological alternatives. While it would be a near-miracle if everybody agreed with
the editors’ decisions, no problem will arise from their decisions, given the glossary they
included (148–53).
Příhonský’s complete text comprises xxiv and 233 pages, which makes for roughly 130
pages of the translation. The editors’ illuminating introduction already makes clear most of
what has to be said on the text itself so that the book does not need additional commentaries.
The editors, however, add four papers on topics closely related to the main theme of the
book—Kant and Bolzano. The comparison between Kant’s and Bolzanos’s views pertain

